Present American policy proclaims the compatibility of drone usage with the traditional Rules of Engagement and the Laws of War. Largely absent in this is an examination of how enemy combatants are being defined on both sides of drone activity: not just the targets and operators but also the relevance of drone technology proliferation. This work engages the void to reveal inconsistent and contradictory ethical standards in American drone policy, based largely on an assumed continued technical preeminence that is by no means guaranteed. The argument is not a humanitarian lament against hegemony: it is a realist argument addressing how ethical inconsistencies in defining American technological warfare compromise the 'leadership high ground' for the United States in a manner that carries fairly significant national security blowback potential.
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Introduction
Present American policy proclaims the compatibility of drone usage with traditional Rules of Engagement and the Laws of War. Some initial analytical criticism is beginning to challenge how drones are used empirically and to a lesser degree asking theoretical and ethical questions from such evidence. Largely absent in this debate is an examination of how enemy combatants are being defined on both sides of drone activity (not just the targets and operators but also the relevance of drone technology proliferation) and how the inexorable spread of technological innovation around the globe might impact these issues. Perhaps most important: could a forced application of the Laws of War to drone usage backfire against American interests as the rest of the world catches up in drone technology? By focusing on this aspect of the debate, the work reveals inconsistent, secret, and contradictory ethical standards in American drone engagement policy, based largely on a desired continued technical preeminence that can by no means be guaranteed. This argument is not a humanitarian lament against United States hegemony. Rather, it is a realist argument addressing how ethical inconsistencies in defining aspects of American technological warfare leave the U.S. potentially compromised in a manner that carries fairly significant national security blowback. In short, as the technical capability gap closes between the United States and its adversaries, the timeframe shortens for when America's "ethical chickens may come home to roost."
This article takes issue with the idea that ethics, transparency, and normalized standards cannot have an impact on the emerging drone environment. Some audiences in the United States believe that they should simply take advantage of the technical superiority for as long as it lasts and then, when such advantage no longer applies, fall back to the tried and true military methods of defense and deterrence to stave off challenges and threats. The only problem with this thought process is that the ethical double-standard inherent to early American drone dominance might be in fact causing the future problems that then have to be remedied by traditional military applications. This is unacceptable. It is not so much that ethical standards and transparent rules destroy threats: it is that a system of ethical consistency and norms standardization might prevent the emergence of such threats to begin with. To ignore or dismiss this idea is akin to blocking all of the potential impact of international norms on drones to the unfortunate detriment of American national security.
While the United States has an obligation to its people, and especially its military service members, to develop capabilities that increase the likelihood of mission success while decreasing American casualties, the somewhat fantastical success of drone strikes gave rise to some awkward but important considerations: if the United States becomes so skilled at waging war from a distance, then has a vital 2 brake on militarism and war-waging been lost? 1 With drones, being used by both the military and intelligence community, is there a unified code of behavior, use, and standards? Who is ultimately responsible if secret missions go awry or mistakes are made? In general, the military has employed a fairly strict code of conduct and responsibility across traditional forms of warfare. 2 This has not always seemed to be the case with drone usage by the Intelligence Community, where the general nature of intelligence activity and Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information classifications make operations shrouded in secrecy. While the President and Department of Defense clearly have defined roles in the process of targeting and establishing restrictions, the perception persists that American drone use is largely beyond societal review. The psychological aspect of extensive drone usage is also gaining momentum in scholarly and policy circles. Some consider drones to be the epitome of numbed technological violence, perhaps covering over the central truth of war being not just about killing but also about death and dying. 3 More important to this research, however, is a lesser-emphasized discussion about how drone warfare has been awkwardly 'force-fed' into the general Laws of War/Rules of Engagement discussion. There seems to be a bit of American foreign policy hubris, where the objective of continued technological dominance is allowing for some rather problematic ethical interpretations. Let us consider the drone 'pilot': is s/he a combatant or non-combatant? At present, the official answer is 'yes and no': while sitting in the command chair and operating the joystick, regardless of location, the drone pilot is indeed a combatant. However, when the pilot clocks off and leaves his/her base, sits down in their Toyota Camry and drives to Taco Bell for a quick lunch, the pilot, depending on whom one asks, either becomes a traditional off-duty combatant like any other off-duty combatant in a forward area, or, miraculously transforms into a non-combatant civilian and cannot be targeted legally. The reason for this divergence may be largely because of the still vague and non-distinct classifications given to drone pilots working for the military versus ones working for the Intelligence Community. This lack of clarity, even while accepting the Intelligence Community's need and desire for secrecy, can eventually cause blowback because of ethical inconsistency. The drone pilot status is based not on the Rules of Engagement, Laws of War, Geneva Conventions, or any other major international legal act or tradition. It is based solely on the fact that the United States at present has de facto exclusive advanced militarized drone technology and keeps 3 secret whatever ethical or legal frameworks it uses to govern such technology. The Obama administration claims the need for secrecy, and in certain intelligence/military operations, this can be justified. But there are definitely consequences to a system that uses secrecy as a denial of ethical transparency, especially when it concerns technology that is quickly being distributed and developed all over the world, amongst friend and foe alike.
It might behoove the United States to worry about creating universal ethical standards or operating under standardized and transparent ethical norms. The flexibility of drone pilot combatant status, for example, would have stark repercussions for the United States were it applied in other arenas: is a Taliban fighter a combatant as he drives and parks a car bomb next to an Afghan police station but then becomes a civilian when he returns home and has dinner with his family in Kabul? The question of course sounds ridiculous but is in fact an accurate application of American drone pilot 'secret ethics' if such ethics were universalized today. The repercussions become more problematic as countrieswhich use drone 'standards' set largely by the United States-become more aggressive in acquiring and developing their own drone capabilities.
Drones are becoming an increasingly important and fascinating subject of investigation, whether it is in the fields of foreign policy, intelligence studies, military affairs, science and technology or ethics. This article takes a holistic approach, looking at aspects of current drone use and application, legal acts and international law customs as they apply to drone technology, the increasingly large body of scholarly voices coming out against drones that are then countered by highly-respected organizations seeking ways to responsibly govern drones in conflict situations, and finally the proliferation of drone technology and how countries around the world are developing new capabilities. When taken in concert it becomes more readily apparent how this Pandora's presumption-a possibly foolhardy assumption of American technological dominance in perpetuity-is not only dangerous but also unlikely. Letting American drone technology be 'governed' by loose and internally contradictory ethical rules could signal a new kind of tech-war in the near future, leaving all of the United States, its interests, and its population at risk, as other adversarial countries and intelligence communities acquire the technology.
Reviewing the Field: Formal Law and Blurred Lines with Drones
There are two major forces working in contradistinction to each other when it comes to U.S. policy on drone development. First, the U.S. Air Force has a clear and explicit objective to have the leanest, most adaptable, most powerful 4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems in the world. 4 Second, most of the pertinent legal questions that could constrain this objective are still openly debated. For example, much of the original foundation for U.S. drone development came from Israel. In December 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) arrived at four main conclusions about drones and their place in conflict:
• The laws of war are applicable to the armed conflict between Israel and terrorist organizations operating in the region. The ISC qualified the conflict as an international armed conflict, even though no other states were involved.
• Targeted killing (the preventative elimination of terrorists) cannot always be deemed legal nor can these actions always be deemed illegal.
• The legality of targeted killings is contingent upon the fact that civilians are not protected from attacks for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
• The principle of proportionality always applies, irrespective of the nature of the conflict and the qualification of the adversary. 5
While "Targeted killing is inscribed into the law in so far as a temporal criterion (imminence) is converted into a qualitative one (gravity). The target, as the one who may be lawfully killed, thus at the same time sees itself included in and excluded from the law. If targeted killing was thought to be unlegalizable-not in the face of a superior norm…but rather given the principle of use of force as a last resort is indeterminable in advance precisely because it is always bound to a singular situation requiring an individual decision-here, the reverse has been proved…When framed within the theater of war, targeted killing categorically seems to be justifiable under the legal principles of necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering." 11
Again, most remarkable about the above legal reasoning is how important the continued exclusive technological dominance of the United States is in drone technology. The United States has a diplomatic habit of positioning its interests as something higher than pure foreign policy and national security priorities. In so doing, it creates a de facto expectation whereby it has exclusive rights to exceptional behavior on the global stage. The obvious risk with such diplomatic calisthenics is that most other countries do not grant such exclusivity or exceptionality to the United States and American actions are therefore seen as potentially precedent-setting and norm-establishing, let alone resentmentgenerating.
The reformulation of targeted killing so that it is both legal and vague, having targets both included in and excluded from the law simultaneously, is not much of a danger as long as the United States maintains drone technology domination. Cracks in that dominance, however, carry stark consequences. Perhaps most perplexing is how the United States does not seem to consider the impact if the above legal formulation about targeted killing was applied by an adversarial state on American targets. It is politically thin ice if American confidence is based on presumed continued technical dominance and a self-declared ethical normalcy. Johansson examined the moral right to use UAVs in war. Her chief concern dealt with the military advantages of UAVs and how they might lead to secret wars with the commensurate lack of transparency. 19 As has been discussed earlier in this article, she considered that the employment of intelligence agencies to be involved in targeted killing with very few clear rules of engagement was ethically compromised. Though this argument is somewhat tautological given the nature of intelligence operations writ large, she considered how questions about civilian intelligence agencies using UAVs could be less relevant in less democratic societies since such societies tended to have very little transparency in their What powerful commentaries like this attest to is the unfortunate probability that current policy on American drones does not intimidate targeted nations but may actually incite a passion for vengeance and retaliation even when American drone action is exclusively focused on non-state actors. This flies directly in the face of American military and intelligence branding, which emphasizes how drones are capable of killing the enemy faster than they can grow them back. 22 The chief relevance is not in the technical efficiency of drones or their powerful capability to eliminate targets. What the literature tends to miss is the building up of a massive amount of legal, diplomatic, political, ethical, and military resentment brought about by an American belief in ethical justification maintained flimsily by technical prowess and an expectation of not being challenged on internal contradictions and inconsistencies. This is not a liberal plea to eliminate drones or handcuff U.S. power. It is, however, a warning to these missed dangers emergent from technological arrogance and ethical selfindulgence.
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These dangers do not disappear even when examining academic and diplomatic projects aimed at bringing drone technology under more universally standardized ethical norms. One such impressive project is highlighted below to show the difficulty that exists in trying to overcome drone ambiguity and opacity. The Center for Civilians in Conflict Report, produced by the Columbia University Law School, released a comprehensive, multi-tiered analysis on the unexamined costs and questions related to the civilian impact of drones. Logically divided into four main sub-headings, giving advice to the Obama administration, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and Congress, the Center's recommendations seem to overwhelmingly imply not only a lack of transparency and accountability in American drone warfare, but there is a surprisingly large need for greater interagency and inter-branch coordination and communication: 23 To the Obama administration:
• Establish a special interagency task force to evaluate covert drone operations and make recommendations to the president on the following issues: • Publicly describe the agency's civilian protection mechanisms, including civilian casualty mitigation processes and post-strike investigatory procedures
• Engage with civil society regarding legal standards for targeting operations; confirm whether the agency regards itself as bound by international law and publicly describe CIA's legal standards or who may be targeted
• Disclose the steps the agency takes to train personnel involved in drone operations, including lawyers, on applicable laws and related civilian protection and harm response tactics and procedures
To the Department of Defense, Special Operations Command, and Joint Special Operations Command:
• Acknowledge that JSOC has a role in drone strikes outside of Afghanistan; declassify information on drone targeting operations once they are completed; and efficiently provide information on the impact of operations on civilians as is done by the military in traditional combat theaters
• Publicly describe the civilian protection mechanisms, including civilian casualty mitigation processes and post-strike investigatory procedures
• Clarify whether directions, rules, and manuals in relation to civilian protection and use of force compliance that are a matter of Department of Defense-wide policy also apply to JSOC operations, including operations conducted under the CIA statutory authority
To Congress:
• Exercise oversight powers to the fullest extent possible in reviewing and evaluating the following issues:
o The extent of civilian casualties from covert drone strikes in the larger impact on civilian communities, including destruction of homes and displacement, and retaliatory violence by local groups o The italicized sections belong to this author and highlight more emphatically what seems to be the absence of rudimentary and fundamental oversight, assessment, evaluation, and efficiency testing for technology that has arguably become the most heavily relied upon counterterrorist tool in the American arsenal. The report implies, for example, that it is not necessarily known if there are any accurate reporting tools for civilian casualties, whether any postoperational success programs are in place, how often alternative resolutions are sought or utilized as opposed to drone strikes, whether JSOC respects the standard DoD compliance rules that have been in place for decades, or even if the Central Intelligence Agency, when using drones, considers itself beholden to international law. Most public debates about drones tend to focus on the President or the CIA. What the Columbia review clearly establishes is an absence of clarity and definition across all four major deliberative bodies that are the main stakeholders governing drone activity and how American drone policy should develop and evolve.
Just as with the literature review, the above policy review testifies to how much current American drone utilization is predicated upon the exclusive and exceptional ability of the United States to dictate terms to all other countries and to strive to maintain such technical dominance on in perpetuity, thereby eliminating the need to be concerned about the lack of uniformity, transparency, and logical consistency in its ethical frameworks. It is true that drones are not solely utilized for counter-terrorist operations and activities. They operate in conventional military operations, border security, peacekeeping, even antipoaching. This article is not trying to conflate drone usage exclusively with counter-terrorism. But it is important to note the distinction that drone operations in these other arenas seem to not suffer from the same inconsistent application of ethics and norms. Instead, the focus is on the area that specifically illustrates the potential of creating more serious future problems for the United States. A cursory investigation reveals just how dangerous these problems could be: 2013 seemed to be a stellar year for drone achievement around the world with pronounced possible military/counter-terrorist applications.
Drone Life: Gadgets and Government with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
The Obama strategy in terms of using drones is focused primarily on counterterrorism. This strategy deals with hindering non-state groups like alQaida, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and now the Islamic State, in countries where there has not been an official American declaration of war against the state. Drone warfare has not been so much under the military's sole purview, but placed under the authority of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA. 25 Efficiency and speed seem to dictate authority and responsibility controls. Robotic warfare is clearly the next great step in the evolution of military force action. Up to now, the United States clearly favors the argument of drones seamlessly fitting into current American rules of engagement. While official policy emphasizes this position, there can be no doubt of the dramatic strategic impact drone warfare has had on U.S. thinking. 26 To that end there has been great focus on the training of UAV operators and how they must take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects, to fit drone technology into status quo rules of engagement. 27 "He must do everything practicable or practically possible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives; he must take all practicable or practically possible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects; he must refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause disproportionate incidental civilian injury and/or damage; he must cancel or suspend the attack if it becomes clear that its objective is not a military objective, that its objective is subject to special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause disproportionate incidental civilian injury or damage." 28 All of this sounds rational and considerate. The United States focuses on the increasingly subtle and comprehensive data collection techniques available to UAV planners and operational decision-makers. In essence, questions that were once considered dependent on field observation are now considered manageable from any distance and location thanks to the advanced capabilities of technology. 
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This does leave open a significant vulnerability. If the equipment functions properly and all information-gathering data is applied accurately, then any unnecessary damage and casualties are pilot error, making him culpable. 29 The United States disagrees, however:
"If for example the data feeds to the controller were adversely affected by a system fault, and if that fault can properly be said to have caused the erroneous decision to attack, then the system failure is likely to exonerate the controller from responsibility for the attack. Similarly, if the opposing party to the conflict, whether through ruses, perfidy, voluntary or involuntary human shielding or otherwise, materially impedes the platform operators task, that will also be affected to take into account when determining responsibility for the resulting events. It would not seem to be reasonable to lay blame at the door of the operator for errors attributable to the supporting systems, enemy action or other causes beyond his control." 30 (Emphasis mine)
There are two pronounced logic flaws in the above argumentation. First, on the issue of system faults, the United States has basically crafted a technological version of having one's cake and eating it too: America capitalizes on its technologically innovative war-making capacity, rightly declares greater success because of that innovation, but then says any mistakes are purely technical and therefore all human operators are absolved of responsibility. No axiom is more telling in the 21st century drone age than technology being both a blessing and a curse: a blessing because of the huge advantages and greater efficiencies it creates and a curse because every technological system ultimately breaks down, misfires, or becomes compromised. For the U.S. to grant human absolution on technical error, when its position is dependent upon technology that is inevitably prone to error is, to say the least, rather cavalier. Especially given in this context such cavalier attitude is in fact dismissing the damage, destruction, or devastation of foreign civilian property and life.
Second, drone operators can be absolved of responsibility based on enemy action. This logic is faulty as it basically states the only way a drone operator could be found culpable for error would be if the enemy stood completely still and waited to be hit by drone fire and instead nearby civilians were hit. It is incredulous to think current American policy, in terms of shielding drone operators from judgment, is based on the principle that the enemy must not fight back. If the enemy engages or attempts to counter the drone objective, then the 29 Ibid. 30 Boothby, "Some Legal Challenges by Remote Attack," 590. drone operator is no longer responsible for any consequential damage or loss of life.
In basic terms, there is nothing unique behind drone warfare. The idea of creating weapons that allow you to fight from a distance, thereby lessening your own risk, has existed since the beginning of time. In some ways the cannon, crossbow, artillery, and air bombardment were all Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) that accomplished the same principle. 31 UAVs function in the same way. Therefore, the fallacious contemporary criticism of drone technology is that it allows the United States to kill people from a much greater distance. The problem is in formulating drone ethics that are highly irregular, logically fallacious, and somewhat contradictory. Taking advantage of technical dominance is not an unwise strategy for any state. But it might be ultimately unwise to develop an ethical position with such technological domination that gives the United States carte blanche authority to utilize the technology without consequence. This is more readily apparent with how the CIA has its own division operating drones. There are some unique aspects to the principle of distinction within international humanitarian law when it comes to CIA drone use. The principle of distinction requires participants in an armed conflict to differentiate themselves from civilians and demands that attackers distinguish between lawful targets and civilian targets. This basic principle is the core of international humanitarian law. The debate has raged within the scholarly community for some time now on what the status of CIA drone operators should be, whether lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents. Gary Solis has argued most powerfully for the latter case:
"CIA agents are, unlike their military counterparts but like the fighters they target, unlawful combatants. No less than their insurgent targets, they are fighters without uniforms or insignia, directly participating in hostilities, employing armed forces contrary to the laws and customs of war. Even if they are sitting in Langley, the CIA pilots are civilians violating the requirement of distinction, a core concept of armed conflict, as they directly participate in hostilities. It makes no difference that CIA civilians are employed by, or in the service of, the U.S. Government or its Armed Forces. They are civilians…They directly participate in hostilities, which means they may be lawfully targeted." 32 Michael Lewis and Emily Crawford astutely point out that wearing or not wearing military uniforms is a misguided focus. The legal purpose for wearing uniforms is 31 Ibid. 32 Michael Lewis and Emily Crawford, "Drones and Distinction: How IHL encouraged the rise of drones," Georgetown Journal of International Law (Spring, 2013).
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to ensure that during active hostilities the combatant is readily distinguishable from the civilian population. 33 The bigger issue for Lewis and Crawford is whether or not the CIA can and does in fact enforce laws of war through its own chain of command. If CIA drone operators are combatants, then they are entitled to combatants' privilege but also eligible to be targeted at all times. If they are unprivileged belligerents, then they could potentially face domestic criminal prosecution in those places where they operate. 34 This is a fascinating discussion in and of itself, as it follows on the traditions inherent to Article 4 of the Geneva Convention dealing with prisoners of war. While it is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present article, it is undoubtedly yet another angle for investigating problematic national security futures when it comes to American drone operations.
What accomplished scholars like Solis, Lewis, and Crawford fail to emphasize is how ultimately irrelevant the principle of distinction and international humanitarian law likely is when it comes to the CIA conducting its drone operations or how it views the rules for drone operators. The non-transparent nature of intelligence and the safely-assumed violation of state sovereignty for intelligence operations in the field means that the CIA is unlikely to support greater oversight and governance for a weapon that helps it accomplish its mission objectives efficiently. The U.S. military has extensive procedures and protocols to establish proper targeting and to assist in making decisions about legal calculations. The CIA, however, either does not have such explicit methodology or it simply refuses to reveal what its methodology actually is. 35 The CIA will likely want to utilize drones in whatever ways it sees fit. If that requires it to circumvent, violate, or operate outside of the general boundaries and norms of international humanitarian law (IHL), then one should expect the IHL to be circumvented, violated, and operated around. People should not dismiss how this is the basic essence of espionage. This article is not attempting to moralize on such positions. Rather, it is trying to show how such cavalier positions, based more so on American technical dominance today rather than any superior ethical or legal foundation for tomorrow, demand that researchers ask an awkward question: what happens when the drone playing field is not so heavily slanted toward the American side?
Catching up in the International Drone Race Control/ Management System and the Ground Control Station. 36 This advancement was based upon already existing Italian software and is designed for control and surveillance missions. It has data fusion, data management, and video exploitation features that are capable of operating missions as diverse as border control, wide-area surveillance, environmental data collection, and disaster control. 37 Nicknamed the Hammerhead, it can carry a variety of payloads and seems to be mostly destined at the moment for maritime patrol, given Italian domestic security concerns with its massive coastline. The possibility of expanding capability and capacity remains likely as the respective CEOs of this joint venture boasted about opportunities in 2015 that could gain them primary position in the international surveillance and security industry. 38 
Pakistan
Late in 2013, after years of preparation and strategic planning, the chief of Pakistan's military formally announced the successful launch of Pakistan's first domestically produced UAVs. The drones, called Burraq and Shahpar, are at present unarmed and to be used only for surveillance according to military officials. 39 Both Pakistani and Western analysts have confirmed how much the development of the drones represents a milestone for the country's military and science community. Pakistan is arguably the state with the most up-close-andpersonal empirical experience when it comes to using drones on its territory. The issue for Pakistan was that this use was conducted only by the United States, beginning immediately after the 9/11 attacks under then President George W. Bush. At the time, President Musharraf asked Bush to supply drone technology to his country. The United States declined (not surprising, given the fact discussed in this article that the entire point of American drone policy is maintain dominance and superiority for as long as possible and deter drone technology proliferation as much as it can). This set off Pakistan's own homegrown effort to develop such technology. The present Pakistani drones have a range of about seventy-five miles, and do not carry weapons payloads. Experts, however, are quick to point out that the type of drone developed by Pakistan (surveillance models) a relatively easy to convert to an armed version, though they will not have the same precision as American models. 40 36 Francis X. Govers III , "Hammerhead UAV takes to the skies over Italy," Gizmag, November 23, 2013, available at: http://www.gizmag.com/hammerhead-uav-italyflight/29889/#%21. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Tim Craig, "Pakistan Unveils its Own Military Drones, as Protests Continue against US Attacks," Washington Post, Dec 2, 2013, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-unveils-its-ownmilitary-drones-as-protests-continue-against-us-attacks/2013/11/25/fae691cc-5607-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html. 40 Ibid.
China
China is not new to the drone technology market. It has operated its own drones for many years. In 2013, however, China established a new level in the evolution of foreign drone technology when it unveiled the Lijian, claiming it to be the first successfully flown 'stealth drone' not originating from the United States. 41 The fact that this Chinese drone has remarkably similar design contours to the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel and the Northrop Grumman X-47B raises questions about the ability of the American military-industrial complex to keep secret technology secret. Unlike other countries pursuing their own drone technology, China offers no denial that this drone in particular is meant to be an unmanned ground attack aircraft, fully weaponized and employable at great distances. 42 Designed by the Shengyeng Aircraft Design Institute and manufactured by the Hongdu Aviation Industry Group, political authorities boasted after the flight that this drone was proof that China had again narrowed the air-power disparity between itself and Western nations. 43 Interestingly, American officials admitted that the inaugural flight of a stealth drone in China was indeed a big step, but they denied this drone could carry the potential of being a balance-shifter since the long-term efficiency of the design remains unproven. Since increased proficiency and intensified efficiency is basically an irrefutable axiom when it comes to the development of technology across the globe, what immediately comes to mind is whether this opinion represents astute analysis or merely wishful political thinking.
South Africa
The Cape Town-based company KND Naval Design, participating in the Dubai air show for the first time in 2013, earned a $30 million order for its newly produced UAVs. It also signed a letter of intent with a Russian company for a similar deal worth an additional $20 million. Discussions are serious enough between KND and Russia that there are expectations it may establish a second production facility in Russian territory. 44 Just as with the Italian initiatives, South Africa focuses at the moment primarily on maritime operations, although executives are already developing marketing promotions for a variety of other applications including wildlife surveillance, geological mapping, aerial photography, news coverage, traffic control, crowd surveillance, pipeline and power line monitoring, and other as yet undefined military applications. 45 South Africa is actually one of the leading industrial states pushing the technical boundaries of UAV performance, believing flights of over 4000 miles and heights of nearly 45,000 feet will become regular standards for the leading companies. It is important to note that at the present time the United States prides itself as being the only country capable of developing drones with such technical prowess. South Africa also seems to be paving the way for creating a legitimate transnational industrial market that will de facto proliferate drone technology to countries presently absent such capability. In other words, states do not need to depend on their own homegrown industries in order to be viable in the drone age. As ever more members join the drone club, the precedents established by the drone leader are going to be relevant.
Islamic Crescent and American Drone 'Wishful Thinking'
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actually succeeded in destroying a drone that it tracked flying over sensitive military installations and was approaching the Dimona nuclear reactor in 2013. The drone was unarmed but was operated by agents elsewhere and attempting to relay images back to a home base. Israelis have not disclosed whether or not that enemy objective was successful but they were certain that the drone was not American, Chinese, or Russian. IDF claimed it to be an Iranian drone that was assembled in Lebanon and flown by Hezbollah. 46 These are the new facts of life when it comes to global drone production: it is too easy to obtain, the barriers for entry on the production side are crumbling far too quickly, and more and more countries see UAV production as an incredibly lucrative business too tempting to pass up. More than seventyfive countries have some type of remote piloted aircraft, with unique drone types now numbering near 1000. 47 In some ways, the era that this article warns of may already be here. Consider: Iran, with the approval of Damascus, carries out a legal strike on anti-Syrian forces inside of Syria; Russia picks off militants that are getting uncomfortably close to oil and gas pipelines in Ukraine, Georgia, and southern Russian; Turkey utilizes a Predator drone, provided by the United States, to kill Kurdish militants in northern Iraq. 48 Having watched American military and intelligence operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan for the last decade, critically important global players like Iran, Russia, China and Turkey have come to 45 Ibid. 46 Kristin Roberts, "When the Whole World has Drones," National Journal (Mar 21, 2013). 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 22 understand that the justification to use drones is basically granted once you are able to label a target as terrorist. 49 In response to this proliferation of not only drone technology but drone capability, American officials have slowly and subtly altered their overall position. Whereas in the past the United States was secure in having an overwhelmingly dominant technical superiority over any and all potential rivals and allies alike, it now claims that technology distribution is not capable of undermining American dominance. What truly fuels American global drone power is the unparalleled intelligence-collection and data-analysis that underpins American capability. 50 On the one hand, this is very true: China doesn't intend to develop drones in order to attack Cameroon. Turkey has no desire to carry out lethal strikes against the citizens of Finland. As such, states that are now aggressively pushing the acquisition of drone technology are seeking drone capabilities of a decidedly more local and regional flavor. What seems dangerously myopic on the part of the United States is how it seems to be building its comfort level by telling itself adversarial national security interests are not ever going to be global or focused on America. An ethical system that justifies unethical behavior as long as it is locally contained is not a system capable of peaceful survival. This is what the author finds akin to drone 'wishful thinking'. The United States sees what it wants to see and hopes no one else bothers to notice what it is purposely ignoring. To wit: the United States does not want other states to have drone technology, until they do. Then it is not about the technology but about the truly global technical strike capabilities. The United States does not want others to have truly global technical strike capabilities, until they do. Then it is not about such strike capacity, but about the intelligence and data-collection techniques. The United States does not want others to have highly sophisticated and adept intelligence and data-collection techniques, until they do. Then it is not about such information-collection talent, but about the fact that no one wants to use it to strike the United States. This is where such wishful thinking falls apart. The United States has developed weaponized drone technology. It has made legal discussions about drone norms and ethics opaque and arbitrary. It has employed drone attacks in some cases outside the conventional rules of engagement and laws of war. To believe that no country would ever have a desire to use the same technology against America, American interests, or American allies seems to be founded upon nothing. This is not diplomatic idealism. It is political fantasy. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.
Such subtle fantasy is so pervasively cloaked in quasi-intellectual legitimacy that it can make such highly-respected and august bodies like the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution fall victim to its charms: both have come out recently to emphasize how 'quickly the window of opportunity is closing' for the United States to establish stability-supporting precedent and clear universal norms on drone development and usage. 51 This qualifies as the aforementioned wishful thinking because it presumes the rest of the global community won't be able to recognize this for what it is: the need for stable precedents and universal ethical norms became necessary to America only when America was no longer the only dominant possessor of the technology.
Hopefully, the United States will not be too blinded or surprised when such requests for stability fall on somewhat reluctant and unmotivated foreign ears. The United States will likely always be the best developer of drone technology and does indeed have the greatest support system for them. This does not, however, mean it will never be at risk to the 'lesser' drone achievements of adversaries in the field.
Conclusion
"Remote weaponry has illuminated a stress in just war theory that runs deep. Technological and military superiority seems to preclude the waging of a just war. It does not allow the opposition to engage warfare in accordance with the principle of jus in bello despite having a just cause. It does create a situation that is morally unacceptable." 52 The United States earned a technical dominance in the twenty-first century when it developed a massive fleet of UAVs unmatched by any other country in the world. The time to establish stability-inducing legal standards and universally accepted ethical norms would have been during the peak of that domination. Nothing would appear more powerful to the weak than when the strong voluntarily constrains itself for the betterment of all. There is no surprise that the United States did not pursue such magnanimity on the global stage. Drone technology is a remote weapon meant to increase lethality for targets and decrease risk for operators. It is a powerful technical drug.
What cannot be avoided with such decisions, however, are the blowback consequences when the technological playing field inevitably becomes more level. The ease-of-use for deploying drones and the decreased danger for attackers mean that drones will inevitably be pursued by the military and intelligence 51 Ibid. 52 Suzy Killmister, "Remote Weaponry: The Ethical Implications," Journal of Applied Psychology 25:2 (2008).
